Abstract. In this paper the Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone method is reexamined for speeding up scalar multiplication. Using the theory of µ-Euclidian algorithm, we provide a rigorous method to reduce the theoretical bound for the decomposition of an integer k in the endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve. We then compare the two different methods for decomposition through computational implementations.
Introduction
Public key cryptosystems based on the discrete log problem on elliptic curves over finite fields(ECC) have gained much attention as a popular and practical scheme for computational advantages as well as for communicational advantages. As the complexity of protocols based on ECC relies mostly on the complexity of scalar multiplication, the dominant cost operation is computing kP for a point P on an elliptic curve.
Various methods for faster scalar multiplication have been devised by selecting relevant objects involving base fields and elliptic curves [1, 3] . For example, by considering elliptic curves defined over the binary field, say Koblitz curves, Koblitz [5] , Meier and Staffelbach [7] and Solinas [12, 13] employed the Frobenius endomorphism to introduce an algorithm for faster scalar multiplication that do not use any point doublings. Extending their ideas, Müller [6] and Smart [11] came up with practical methods which are applicable to elliptic curves over small finite fields of small characteristic.
Recently, Gallant, et al. [3] presented a new method for faster scalar multiplication on elliptic curves over (large) prime fields that have an efficientlycomputable endomorphism. The key idea of their method is decomposing an arbitrary scalar k in terms of an integer eigenvalue λ of the characteristic polynomial of such an endomorphism(See §3). The problem with this method is how efficiently a random integer k ∈ [1, n − 1] could be decomposed into k = k 1 + k 2 λ modulo n with the bitlengths of k 1 and k 2 half that of k where n is a large prime number. They gave an algorithm for decomposing k into the desired form using the extended Euclidean algorithm and did not derive explicit bounds for decomposition components. However, they expected that the bounds are approximately near to √ n on the basis of numerous implementations.
In this paper, we present an alternate algorithm for decomposing an integer k using the theory of µ-Euclidian algorithm. This algorithm runs a little bit faster than that of Gallant et al.'s and unlike their algorithm, our algorithm gives explicit bounds for the components. To compare the two algorithms for scalar decomposition we give a precise analysis of all elliptic curves treated in [3] . This paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we recall some basic facts on elliptic curves and in Section 3 we briefly discuss the Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone method for comparison with ours. Section 4 is concerned with decomposing an integer k via µ-Euclidian algorithm in the endomorphism rings of elliptic curves. Section 5 contains various examples of elliptic curves and then we give explicit bounds for decomposition components. In the final section we compare two methods to draw our conclusions.
Endomorphism Rings
We begin with introducing some basics to elliptic curves. Let F q be a finite field of q elements and E be an elliptic curve over F q given by a Weierstrass equation
with a i ∈ F q . E(F q ) denotes the set of F q -rational points on E together with the point at infinity O and End(E) denotes the ring of F q -endomorphisms of E. It is well known that (non-supersingular) elliptic curves over finite fields have complex multiplication. Indeed, End(E) is isomorphic to a complex quadratic order. The Frobenius endomorphism Φ ∈ End(E) is the morphism given by Φ(x, y) = (x q , y q ). It satisfies the quadratic relation Φ 2 − tΦ + q = 0 in End(E), where t is called the trace of the Frobenius Φ. More importantly, t is related closely to the order of E(F q ) by the formula: #E(F q ) = q + 1 − t. By Hasse's remarkable work on #E(F q ), we have Theorem 1. Let E be an elliptic curve over F q and let n denote the number of
For cryptographic applications, one deals with only non-supersinglar elliptic curves E, so the endomorphism ring of E is an order in the imaginary quadratic field Q( t 2 − 4q). Hence it is easily seen that Z[Φ] ⊂ End(E) ⊂ Q( t 2 − 4q).
Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone Method
Let E be an elliptic curve over F q and φ be an efficiently-computable endomorphism in End(E). For cryptographic purposes, the order of E(F q ) must have a large prime factor n. Let P ∈ E(F q ) be a point of prime order n. Then the map φ acts on the subgroup of E(F q ) generated by P as a multiplication by λ, where λ is a root of the characteristic polynomial of φ modulo n. In place of the Frobenius, Gallant et al. exploited φ to speed up the scalar multiplication by decomposing an integer k into a sum of the form
Since φ(P ) can be easily computed, a windowed simultaneous multiple exponentiation applies to k 1 P + k 2 φ(P ) for additional speedup. It is analyzed in [3] that this method improves a running time up to 66 % compared with the general method, thus it is roughly 50 % faster than the best general methods for 160-bit scalar multiplication. The problem we face is how efficiently a randomly chosen k can be decomposed into a sum of the required form and how explicitly upper bounds of the lengths of the components k 1 and k 2 can be given. For complete comparison with our method we will now describe the algorithm in [3] for decomposing k out of given integers n and λ. It is composed of two steps. By considering the homomorphism f :
As a stage of precomputations this process can be done by the Extended Euclidean algorithm, independently of k. Secondly, one needs to find a vector in Zv 1 +Zv 2 that is close to (k, 0) using linear algebra. Then (k 1 , k 2 ) is determined by the equation:
is represented as an element in Q × Q and b denotes the nearest integer to b. We provide an explicit algorithm in [3] as follows:
This algorithm takes two round operations and eight large integer multiplications. In [3, Lemma 2] , an upper bound of the vector (k 1 , k 2 ) obtained from Algorithm 1 is estimated by the Euclidean norm inequality :
In the procedure of finding two independent short vectors v 1 
explicitly. However they expected heuristically that v 2 would also be short. For this reason, they could not give explicit upper bounds of k 1 and k 2 although the lengths of components prove to be near to √ n through numerous computational experiments.
An Alternate Decomposition of k
We are now describing a new method for decomposing k from a viewpoint of algebraic number theory. Recall that End(E) is a quadratic order of
We assume that the discriminant of φ defined by D φ = t 2 φ − 4n φ is of the form −Dm 2 for some integer m. As usual, for a point P ∈ E(F q ) of a large prime order n we want to perform scalar multiplication kP for k ∈ [1, n − 1]. Suppose now that there exists an element α = a + bφ ∈ Z[φ] such that
for some positive integer s n , which is relatively small to n. We then want to decompose a scalar k using a division by α in the µ-Euclidean ring Z[φ], where µ is some positive real (see Lemma 2 or [11] ). First of all, the existence of such α is guaranteed from the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists an element
is a principal maximal order and n splits in Q(φ)/Q.
The second assertion follows from [14] . ✷ Motivated by the work of [3] we give an alternate decomposition of k in terms of φ in place of λ in [3] . Viewing a k as an element of Z[φ] we divide k by α satisfying (2) in Z[φ] and write
From a representation of ρ, that is, ρ = k 1 + k 2 φ, it turns out that
Since φ(P ) is easily computed we can apply a (windowed) simultaneous multiple exponenciation to yield the same running time improvement as in [3] . Unlike [3] our method gives rigorous bounds for the components k 1 , k 2 in term of n φ . To see this, we give the following theorem estimating
Then α can be written as a 1 + b 1 φ in term of this new basis. For a given dividend β, we let γ = β/α and then we have
whereᾱ denotes the complex conjugate of α. Take δ = y 1 + y 2 φ with y i = x i /N α (i = 1, 2), where x denotes the nearest integer to x. Finally, take
. It is easily checked that
✷ From the proof of Theorem 2, we can produce an efficient algorithm to compute a remainder ρ = k 1 + k 2 φ from k and α = a + bφ. It is also composed of two steps as in [3] . As a stage of precomputations, we first compute ≈ n and N α , T, N, c, a 1 , b 1 .
Algorithm 2 (Divide k by α = a + bφ)

Input: k
Algorithm 2 takes in general two round operations and eight large integer multiplications as in Algorithm 1. But if the values t φ and n φ are rather small, then the values c and N are also expected to be small, which reduces 8 large integer multiplications to 6. From this observation we may expect that the proposed algorithm will be a little bit more efficient than that of [3] . In Table 1 we compare running times of two algorithms applied to Examples 1-4 in §5.1. 
Examples and Upper Bounds
Examples
In this subsection we list up a family of elliptic curves over a large prime field F p with efficient endomorphisms treated in [3] and give the characteristic polynomial of such an endomorphism in each case.
Example 1.
Let p ≡ 1 (mod 4) be a prime, and let E 1 be an elliptic curve defined by
Let β ∈ F p be an element of order 4. Then the map φ : βy) and O → O belongs to End(E 1 ). Moreover, it is easily seen that φ satisfies the quadratic equation 
Example 2.
Let p ≡ 1 (mod 3) be a prime, and let E 2 be an elliptic curve defined by
Let γ ∈ F p be an element of order 3. Then the map φ : E 2 → E 2 defined by (x, y) → (γx, y) and O → O is an endomorphism defined over F p . Moreover, the quadratic equation of φ is given by
. It is noted in both Examples 1 and 2 that the map φ can be easily computed using only one multiplication in F p .
Example 3.
Let p > 3 be a prime such that −7 is a perfect square in F p , and let ω = (1 + √ −7)/2, and let a = (ω − 3)/4. Let E 3 be an elliptic curve defined by
Then the map φ :
and O → O belongs to End(E 3 ). Moreover, φ satisfies
Example 4. Let p > 3 be a prime such that −2 is a perfect square in F p . Let E 4 be an elliptic curve defined by
and O → O belongs to End(E 4 ). Moreover, the quadratic equation of φ is given by φ 2 + 2 = 0, so t φ = 0, n φ = 2 and End(E 4 ) is isomorphic to Z[φ], the maximal order of Q( √ −2). In Examples 3 and 4, computing an endomorphism is a little harder than doubling a point. k 1 , k 2 Now we restrict ourselves to elliptic curves E(F p ) only in the previous subsection. For cryptographic applications, let P be a point of E(F p ) of large prime order n, so #E(F p ) = hn where h is called the cofactor of E(F p ). Recall that for each . Indeed, this process can be done using the known methods such as Shanks' algorithm [9] and lattice reduction method [10] . Especially, one can also represent n, which splits in Q( √ −D)/Q, by the principal form only by using the Cornacchia's algorithm [2] . We use Theorem 2 to give explicit upper bounds on µ in the µ-Euclidean ring Z[φ].
Upper Bounds on the Components
1 ≤ i ≤ 4, End(E i ) = Z[φ] is
Lemma 2. Let
Proof. Recall that t φ is even for E 1 and E 4 , and t φ is odd for E 2 and E 3 . From the proof of Theorem 2, we get 
Proof. In case of E 1 , it is easy to see that
, which completes the proof for E 1 .
In case of E 2 , we have
Then by Lemma 2, we easily deduce
the proof for E 2 . The other cases are also done similarly. ✷
Comparisons of the Two Methods and Conclusion
Comparisons
In this section we compare the two methods by decomposing many integral scalars on all elliptic curves in Section 5. To protect Pohlig-Hellman attack [8] the group order of E(F p ) has a large prime factor n at least 160-bit. The problem of determining the group order of a given elliptic curve is not an easy task in general but thanks to an improved Schoof's algorithm one can figure out the group order of an elliptic curve. However, in the case where the endomorphism ring is known, computing the group order of E(F p ) is rather easy and it is explicitly given by a well known formula in [4] . Conversely, determining the elliptic curve having a given group order is not easy. For this reason, it is not easy to take 'cryptographically good' elliptic curves whose the group order has a large prime factor n and has a small cofactor. Without knowing the exact group order of elliptic curves we here decompose scalars by the two methods under the assumption that elliptic curves in consideration are good cryptographically. Indeed our method gives a decomposition of a scalar if only we know the quadratic equation satisfied by an efficient endomorphism on elliptic curves. For each example in subsection 5.1, we considered various primes p where p is the norm of some element π ∈ Z[φ] satisfying N Z[φ]/Z (1 − π) = nh for a large prime n and a small h. We then decomposed 10 5 random integers k ∈ [1, n − 1]. In an appendix we put a list of tables showing comparable data in two decompositions. Here we briefly describe implementation results. For Example 1 the two decompositions are identically same for 20 different primes p. In other examples different decompositions of k occurred but for most of scalars k the decompositions are exactly same and in different cases the length differences for components are within 2 bits because the ratios of maximum lengths are less than 3, so it makes no big difference in applying the simultaneous windowed techniques. On the whole, we can analyze that the two decompositions are same for more than 80 % out of all cases we have investigated. In different decompositions, the length differences are almost negligible.
Conclusion
We described an alternate method of decomposing k using the theory of µ-Euclidian algorithm. The proposed method gives not only a different decomposition of a scalar k but also produces explicit upper bounds for the components by computing norms in the complex quadratic orders. We then compare the two different methods for decomposition through computational implementations. From these we conclude that the two decompositions are same for most of cases of elliptic curves we have considered. Even in different decompositions of a same scalar, the two methods makes no big difference in a sense that the length differences of components are very small. So this shows that the algorithm of [3] runs smoothly with desired bounds for components, as expected.
